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NOTE
THE CURRENT VALUE OF COMPULSORY PROCESS:
CAN A DEFENDANT COMPEL THE ADMISSION OF
FAVORABLE ScIENTIFIc TESTIMONY?
INTRODUCTION
The law is replete with vague standards of liability and am-
biguous definitions of proprietary right and individual rights. Al-
though uniform principles may emerge from the resolution of a
particular dispute or prosecution of a specific crime, the true value
of law is its ability to adapt to varying contexts and incorporate
change as justice demands. Science, however, seeks universal truths
that are applicable in all contexts and uniformly descriptive of
observed phenomena. Oftentimes, the true value of scientific re-
search is that it raises as many questions as it answers. While the
quest for scientific knowledge may take years or even decades, the
search for legal truth, particularly in a criminal trial, must proceed
at an accelerated pace.'
Despite these differences, legal doctrine increasingly relies on
scientific knowledge to give meaning to vague standards or to
evaluate the physical evidence of a crime. As society relies on
technological advances to ease the burdens of everyday life, it is
neither surprising nor necessarily detrimental for methods of proof
to incorporate scientific wisdom. The danger inherent in a marriage
of science and law, however, is that this relationship may be
forged upon theories and techniques that are not yet proven reli-
'. The Sixth Amendment provides that the "accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy ... trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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able, or that are reliable for a limited purpose. Both the common
law of evidence and codified evidentiary rules, such as the Federal
Rules of Evidence, recognize that the reliability of scientific evi-
dence should be a central criterion of admissibility and not merely
a factor affecting its weight or credibility.
Certainly in federal jurisdictions, and in states that have
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial judge functions as
a "gatekeeper" to filter out unreliable scientific evidence, whether
offered by the defense or the prosecution. In the context of a crim-
inal trial, however, the defendant is granted the right to present
favorable, relevant, and reliable evidence in his/her defense under
the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause.' Thus, a de-
fendant might successfully challenge the exclusion of evidence that
is relevant and material to his/her defense as a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to present evidence at trial.
The Supreme Court sustained such a challenge on three nota-
ble occasions. In Washington v. Texas,3 the Court invalidated a
state evidentiary rule that prohibited the defendant, but not the
prosecution, from introducing the testimony of an accomplice.' It
held that the wholesale exclusion of defense evidence based on
general presumptions regarding unreliability violated the defendant's
right to compulsory process.' It expressly denounced, however, the
use of compulsory process to invalidate testimonial privileges or
state rules disqualifying witnesses that are mentally incompetent to
testify. 6 In Chambers v. Mississippi,7 the Court extended the rea-
soning of Washington to find a state rule that excepted hearsay
statements made against pecuniary interests, but not penal interests,
a violation of due process.' The Court specifically noted the "per-
suasive assurances of trustworthiness"9 that surrounded an out-of-
court confession. If believed by the jury, they could have exoner-
1 The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
'. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
4. See id. at 22.
5. See id.
6 See id. at 23 n.21.
7- 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
8 See id. at 302.
9. Id.
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ated the defendant." Finally, in Rock v. Arkansas," the Court
held that the exclusion of a defendant's hypnotically refreshed
testimony, under a state rule barring the admission of all hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony, violated both due process and compulso-
ry process.'
This Note attempts to demonstrate that the traditional authority
and discretion of the trial judge to exclude potentially unreliable
scientific evidence is not greatly impacted by the cumulative effect
of these three opinions. Section I discusses the development of the
Compulsory Process Clause and the Supreme Court's corresponding
construction of the right to present evidence at trial. Section II
delineates the scope of compulsory process and proposes that
Washington and its progeny embody a rational basis test for evalu-
ating a defendant's right to present evidence. This test is applied in
Section III in the context of rules governing the admissibility of
expert testimony, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 702,13 and
rules excluding evidence under the legal relevance doctrine, such as
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.'4 The discussion demonstrates that
the relatively weak constitutional standard will rarely supersede
either the interests in preserving the truth-seeking function of a
criminal trial, or the integrity of the adversary system that the evi-
dentiary rules excluding unreliable scientific evidence serve. Final-
ly, Section IV uses two types of controversial scientific evidence-
polygraph and psychiatric evidence-to dispel the theory that the
Sixth Amendment serves as a prophylactic for the exclusion of
potentially unreliable scientific evidence.
This Note concludes that the primary purpose of compulsory
process, equalizing the position of the defense and the prosecution
at trial,' s is served by prohibiting arbitrary exclusions of evidence
critical to the defense. Such a prohibition recognizes that the value
of compulsory process is to secure for the defendant merely the
opportunity to have the admissibility of his/her evidence assessed.
1'0 See id. at 297.
"- 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
'2- See id. at 51-53, 62.
' FED. R. EVID. 702.
FED. R. EviD. 403.
's. See Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MicH. L. REv. 71, 78
(1974) (noting that by 1791, compulsory process "represented the culmination of a long-
evolving principle that the defendant should have a meaningful opportunity, at least on a
par with that of the prosecution, to present a case in his favor through witnesses").
8671998]
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I. ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO PRESENT WITNESSES FAVORABLE TO
THE DEFENSE
The Sixth Amendment largely reflects a collection of proce-
dural rights afforded a criminal defendant at trial.16 The Compul-
sory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment can be interpreted
narrowly to guarantee the defendant only the use of the court sanc-
tioned subpoena process to compel the physical presence of wit-
nesses at trial. 7 A broad characterization that implicates a right to
both obtain and present witnesses at trial has also been attributed
to the clause.'" Before examining the source and scope of a
defendant's right to present evidence, it will prove instructive to
briefly survey the history of the Compulsory Process Clause and
the Supreme Court's early decisions on the right to present wit-
nesses at trial.
James Madison's draft of the Sixth Amendment was adopted
without much debate or controversy, since most of its guarantees
were already accepted at common law. 9 The Virginia Declaration
'6 The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNrrED STATES, 430-31, 437-38, 442 n.162, 449, 455 (1971) (detailing the vari-
ous rights afforded defendants at trial).
17. See United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that
the defendant's compulsory process rights would have been exhausted by the witness'
physical availability at court); Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 796-97 (1976)
(arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the appropriate
source of the right to produce evidence at trial and that the Compulsory Process Clause
merely grants a defendant access to the court's subpoena power).
" See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (holding that the compulsory
process guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause and that the "right to present... witnesses to establish a de-
fense ... is a fundamental element of due process of law"); Westen, supra note 15, at
74 (arguing that "compulsory process constitutionalizes the entire presentation of the
defendant's case" (emphasis added)).
19* See EDMUND RANDOLPH, ESSAY ON THE REVOLUIONARY HISTORY OF VIRGINIA,
reprinted in I BERNARD ScHwARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGrs: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
246, 248 (1971). The amendment's only real point of debate centered around the right to
a jury drawn from the place where the crime was committed. See Westen, supra note 15,
at 77 n.12. This right was "designed by framers mindful of recent abuses by which de-
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of Rights, which served as a model for the Sixth Amendment,
"reenact[ed] in substance, modes for defence, for accused persons,
similar to those under the English law." 0
After independence, nine States provided the defendant the
right to produce witnesses and three states, including Virginia,
provided the defendant "the right to 'call for evidence in his
favour."'21 In formulating the Compulsory Process Clause, Madi-
son replaced this terminology with the "right... to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Although
there may be some ambivalence over the importance of the dis-
crepancy in language, the only mention of the Clause in the con-
gressional record focused on the subpoena power. 3 This supports,
perhaps, a narrower scope to the Clause and indicates congressional
intent to limit its reach. Consider the response to an amendment
suggestion which would have provided for the continuance of trial
if subpoenas of material witnesses were not served: "[I]n securing
him the right of compulsory process, the Government did all it
could; the remainder must lie in the discretion of the court."24
It is the scope of the court's discretion which determines the
threshold at which a defendant's right to present evidence in his
favor is triggered. The early decisions of the Supreme Court not
only presented the potential origins of such a right, but emerged
from the "most outrageous violations of this guarantee." Despite
the limits their factual contexts may pose to an extension of the
principles they announce, the analytic framework adopted displays
a cautious recognition of a right to present evidence which may
prove inimical to the.broad interpretation suggested in later deci-
sion .
United States v. Reid' was the first case the Supreme Court
fendants were transported at great inconvenience back to England to be tried by juries
that knew nothing of the circumstances of the crime." Id. at 78 n.12; see also FRANCIs
HowARD HELLER, SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 92-
101 (1951) (discussing the origins of the Sixth Amendment procedural guarantees).
20 RANDOLPH, supra note 19, at 248.
21. Westen, supra note 15, at 94-95 (quoting PA. DECLARATION OF RTs. art IX
(1776); VT. DECLARATION OF RTS. art. X (1777); VA. DECLARAION OF RTS. art. 8
(1776)).
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 685-792 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789), reprinted in 2 BER-
NARD SCHwARiTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1107-14 (1971).
24 Id. at 1114.
25. Clinton, supra note 17, at 796.
2 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851), overruled in part by Rosen v. United States, 245
1998]
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considered regarding the excludability of a defense witness's testi-
mony. In affirming the exclusion of an accomplice's testimony, the
Court held that "rules of evidence in criminal cases, are the rules
which were in force in the respective States when the Judiciary
Act of 1789 was passed." Since no right to call an accomplice
to testify was available in the state courts in 1789, and no specific
guarantee in the Bill of Rights provided for it, the defendant could
not introduce such testimony in a federal criminal trial? 8
Reid was later overruled by Rosen v. United States,2 9 which
held the testimony of an accomplice appearing for the prosecution
admissible. The Court noted that
[T]ruth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testi-
mony of all persons of competent understanding who may
seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case,
leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be de-
termined by the jury or by the court, rather than by reject-
ing witnesses as incompetent.3
Neither Rosen nor Reid, however, were premised on constitutional
principles; they relied on statutory construction of evidentiary rules
and Supreme Court authority to "supervise the mode of trial in the
inferior federal courts.
32
Although presented with opportunities to apply the Due Process
Clause to criminal cases originating in state courts prior to the
1960's, the Court mainly relegated such analysis to civil cases.
Here it recognized as fundamental the "right to be heard" in one's
defense. 3 When confronted with a challenge to a state criminal
U.S. 467 (1918).
21" Id. at 366.
2 See id.
29- 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
30. See id. at 471-72.
31- Id. at 471.
3. Clinton, supra note 17, at 744; see also Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243
(1913) (finding declarations against penal interests to be outside any traditional hearsay
rule exception, regardless of independent indicia of reliability and the centrality of the
evidence to the defense). But see id. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I think we ought to
give [the defendant] the benefit of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such
weight [as a dying declaration]." (emphasis added)).
- See Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897) ("[D]ue process of law signifies a
right to be heard in one's defence. . . "); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876)
("Wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend, for the
liability and the right are inseparable. This is a principle of natural justice, recognized as
such by the common intelligence and conscience of all nations."); Clinton, supra note 17,
[Vol. 48:865
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conviction on the grounds of an erroneous exclusion of defense
evidence, the Court relied on the "guarantees enumerated in the
fifth and sixth Amendments... rather than on the impairment of
the defendant's ability to defend himself."'3 Although the analytic
trend has not followed a linear course, the wholesale and to some
extent partial exclusion of defense evidence triggered constitutional
protection in some contemporary cases in "what might loosely be
called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evi-
dence. 35
In Washington v. Texas,36 the Court construed the Compulsory
Process Clause as guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right to
present "testimony [that] would have been relevant and material,
and ... vital to the defense.'3 7 In holding a state rule that pro-
hibited the defendant but not the prosecution from introducing the
testimony of an accomplice, the Court noted that "arbitrary rules
that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying
on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of
belief' is as violative of the Constitution as was the common law
tradition of barring all testimony for the defense.3" It further
found that the rule could not be "defended on the ground that it
rationally sets apart a group of persons who are particularly likely
to commit perjury."'39
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan disagreed with the
reliance on compulsory process, arguing that due process is not
"reducible to 'a series of isolated points,' but is rather 'a rational
continuum which.., includes a freedom from all substantial arbi-
trary impositions and purposeless restraints. '" ' 4 He distinguished
at 748-49 (discussing cases which have held that the right to present a defense is a fun-
damental constitutional right).
3 Clinton, supra note 17, at 756. But see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274-76 (1948)
(reversing a summary criminal contempt charge and concluding that a reasonable opportu-
nity to defend was a central element of due process of law).
35 United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982). This case is dis-
cussed further infra, at notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
x 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
37. Id. at 16.
x Id. at 22. The Court, in a footnote, also stated that "[n]othing in this opinion
should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against
self-incrimination.. . Nor do we deal with nonarbitrary state rules that disqualify as
witnesses persons who, because of mental infirmity or infancy, are incapable of observing
events or testifying about them." Id. at 23 n.21.
39. Id. at 22.
"0- Id. at 24 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543
(1961)).
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this case from one where the defendant challenges a valid state
evidentiary law that is predicated upon "general experience with a
particular class of persons" and reflective of a judgment as to how
the "pursuit of truth is best served.
' 41
The Supreme Court faced a similar challenge to the exclusion
of defense evidence in Chambers v. Mississippi,42 and extended
the reasoning of Washington to find a due process violation.43 To
prohibit the defendant from cross-examining a witness he had
called to testify, the Mississippi trial court relied on a common law
rule that a party may not impeach its own witness." The trial
court also excluded the testimony of three witnesses that claimed a
third party confessed to the crime shortly after it was commit-
ted.45 Based on the collective impact of the exclusions, the Su-
preme Court found that the defendant was denied a fair trial.'
The Court noted, however, that its judgment established "no new
principles of constitutional law" and was limited to the "facts and
circumstances" of the case.47 Specifically, the Court noted that the
lack of "conventional indicia of reliability" surrounding out of
court statements gave rise to the hearsay rule, but exceptions
evolved when statements were made under "circumstances that tend
to assure reliability."' 8 Since the state recognized an exception for
statements made against pecuniary interests, the Court extended the
exception to reach statements made against the penal interest of the
declarant when those statements were shrouded with "persuasive
assurances of trustworthiness.' 4 Although the Court found funda-
mental the right of an accused to present witnesses in his defense,
the "accused, as is required of the State, must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both
fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and inno-
cence."
50
41- Id. at 24-25.
42 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
41. See id. at 302.
44 See id. at 295.
45. See id. at 298.
46 See id. at 302-03.
47. id.
48- Id. at 298-99.
49- Id. at 302. But see id. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ('Were I to reach the
merits in this case, I would have considerable difficulty in subscribing to the Court's
further constitutionalization of the intricacies of the common law of evidence.").
'o. Id. at 302.
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Compulsory process once again factored into the analysis when
the Court considered a challenge to a state evidentiary rule that
rendered hypnotically refreshed testimony per se inadmissible. In
Rock v. Arkansas,51 the trial court excluded portions of the
defendant's own testimony that were the product of hypnotically
refreshed memory. 2 The court reasoned that such testimony is
presumptively unreliable. 3 The Supreme Court held that the
"wholesale" exclusion of the defendant's testimony violated her
fundamental right to testify on her own behalf, grounding the right
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Com-
pulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and as a corollary
to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination.' 4
The Court interpreted the guarantees of the Compulsory Process
Clause to encompass the right to present witness testimony that is
"'material and favorable to his defense,"'55 which necessarily in-
cluded the "right to testify himself, should he decide it is in his
favor to do so."' 6 The Sixth Amendment's implied right of self-
representation, and the defendant's right to "present his own ver-
sion of events in his own words" may be restricted by a state
evidentiary rule, however, if the state can justify the legitimacy of
the countervailing interests served by the rule. 8 In this regard the
Court found that
Arkansas ... has not justified the exclusion of all of a
defendant's testimony that the defendant is unable to prove
to be the product of prehypnosis memory. A State's legiti-
mate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend
to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual
case.... The State... may be able to show that testimo-
ny in a particular case is so unreliable that exclusion is
justified.59
The Court further noted that the inaccuracies that hypnotically
refreshed testimony may introduce could partially be controlled by
SI. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
17 See id. at 56.
53- See idu at 58.
' See id. at 51-53 & n.10.
5" Id. at 52 (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
S& Id.
SId.
See id. at 55-56.
" Id. at 61.
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adopting procedural safeguards in the administration of hypnosis
and through the "more traditional means" of testing accuracy, such
as cross-examination. °
I[. RECONCILING THE SOURCE AND SCOPE OF A DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO PRESENT WITNESSES AT TRIAL
The source and scope of a defendant's right to present witness-
es in his/her favor remains ambiguous,61 especially in the context
of state evidentiary rules that exclude witness testimony based on
its potential unreliability. While some courts interpreted Washington
v. Texas62 to extend compulsory process to all relevant evidence
the defense proffered,6 most accept the limitations inherent in
such a right. 4 The trend in the case law seems to favor a balanc-
ing of competing interests,' particularly when partial exclusions
of defense evidence are at issue. Although Washington expressly
incorporated the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process guarantee
into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 6 it did not
clearly define which aspects of the right are deemed fundamental
60- See id. at 60-61.
61. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (declining to "de-
cide . . . whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ from
those of the Fourteenth Amendment"). It should be noted at the outset that the following
discussion is premised upon the assumption that the Compulsory Process Clause is the
precise source of a defendant's right to present evidence. To the extent that Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and a handful of lower court cases deviated from strict
adherence to the Compulsory Process Clause as the source of the right, and based their
analyses on the Due Process Clause, this may be attributed to "faulty advocacy," Westen,
supra note 15, at 150, or a reluctance to "incorporat[e] the specifics of the Bill of Rights
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 151 n.384. But see
Clinton, supra note 17, at 795 (proposing that a fundamental fairness standard, grounded
in the Due Process Clause, should govern the analysis of a defendant's right to present a
defense).
62- 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
63- See, e.g., State v. Lowther, 740 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Haw. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
that the accused has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence in his defense,
although not citing directly to Washington).
" See, e.g., Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 ("Of course, the right to present relevant testimony
is not without limitation."); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (noting that the accused must
"comply with established rules of procedure and evidence").
. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (noting that the Court has "nev-
er questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of eviden-
tiary rules that themselves serve the interest of fairness and reliability-even if the defen-
dant would prefer to see that evidence admitted").
66 See Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
[Vol. 48:865
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and subject to strict judicial review.' This Section attempts to
rectify this ambiguity, and examines whether the test or standard
applied in the Washington line of cases comports with the principle
of heightened scrutiny of state rules or actions which infringe upon
a fundamental right. This Section proposes that a reduced level of
scrutiny should be invoked when reviewing exclusions of scientific
evidence offered by the defense.
The Bill of Rights has served as a guide in establishing the
content of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' Many of the guarantees of the first eight Amendments,
and all but one of the criminal procedural rights, have been "selec-
tively incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment 69 A specific
provision was originally made applicable to the states if it embod-
ied "principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" and thus
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."70 The Court refined
this standard to reflect the specific characteristics comprising state
criminal processes, and focused the analysis on "whether... a
procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered hberty."'
67 See id.
68 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSrITt=oNAL LAW 772 (2d ed. 1988).
. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
7. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.), overruled by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
' Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14. Although Duncan involved a procedural due pro-
cess claim, its doctrinal basis was extended to substantive due process analysis in Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.12 (1977). The doctrine surrounding the
Due Process Clause spawned two interconnected lines of analysis. One form, characterized
as procedural due process, "delineates the constitutional limits on judicial, executive, and
administrative enforcement of legislative or other governmental dictates." TRIBE, supra note
68, at 664. The other form, termed substantive due process, analyzes the constitutional
limits on the content of legislative action. See id. at 664 n.4. Although these labels help
to organize a large body of constitutional precedent, they do little to assist the analysis in
a particular case. In deciding what process is due, the distinction between procedural and
substantive choices quickly erodes. See i& at 712. For example, a statutory rule banning
the use of polygraph evidence restricts not only the procedural form of a defendant's
case, but reflects a legislative judgment as to the degree of reliability evidence must have
in order for a jury to make an informed and rational decision. In terms of the Compulso-
ry Process Clause, there may also be both procedural and substantive elements--the right
to the subpoena process and the substantive right to participate at trial through the presen-
tation of favorable witnesses. See generally i& at 713-14 (discussing the self-realization
aspects of the right to be heard in one's defense). Defining what process is due under the
Compulsory Process Clause, however, does not relegate the analysis to the nomenclature
of due process adjudication, for we must necessarily deviate from the literal command of
the language-compulsory process--to determine its scope and levels of protection. A
majority of the Court has never held, for example, that speech may not be limited in par-
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The fact of incorporation, however, does little to define the
contours of the specific guarantees absorbed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, or to define which aspects apply with equal force to
the state governments. 72 The decision in Washington highlights
both aspects of this problem, since the federal criminal cases it
relied upon were decided on nonconstitutional grounds and provid-
ed no guidance as to the scope of the Sixth Amendment's Compul-
sory Process Clause.73 Despite the Court's earlier assertion that
"[tlhere may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution,"74 it appeared willing to
consider a "rational" purpose for the state evidentiary rule a suffi-
cient justification. 75 The focus of its finding centered around the
ticular circumstances, notwithstanding the explicit command of the First Amendment that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend.
I; see, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("It is a fundamental princi-
ple ... that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitu-
tion, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish."). Similarly, the task under
the Compulsory Process Clause is to define the permissible limits on a defendant's right
to present evidence and delineate the level of deference that is likely to be accorded a
legislative or judicial restriction on such a right.
' See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(stating that the specific provisions of the Constitution are no more precise than due pro-
cess); cf. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369-71 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(noting that although nonunanimous juries may constitutionally return criminal convictions
in state trials, only a unanimous jury may constitutionally return a criminal conviction in
a federal trial (The congruence the Johnson Court mandated, despite internal contradiction,
is likely to be resolved by abandoning strict symmetry in application of the jury trial
right. See TRIBE, supra note 68, at 773 n.25.)).
73. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1967) (citing United States v. Reid,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851), overruled in part by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S.
467 (1918); Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918)); see also supra notes 26-32
and accompanying text.
. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
. See Washington, 388 U.S. at 22 (stating that the "rule disqualifying an alleged
accomplice from testifying on behalf of the defendant cannot even be defended on the
ground that it rationally sets apart a group of persons who are particularly likely to com-
mit perjury" (emphasis added)). Before continuing, it would be prudent to explain the
origin of some doctrinal labels that will appear throughout this discussion. The terms
"rational basis" and "heightened scrutiny" are lifted from methods of constitutional inter-
pretation employed in the areas of substantive due process and equal protection. See gen-
erally supra note 71 (discussing the concept of substantive due process); infra note 85
(discussing equal protection). They are terms of art associated with a form of constitution-
al analysis that requires the decision maker to identify and weigh both the individual
interests protected by constitutional command and the countervailing interests of govern-
ment or society in general. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 945-46 (1987). This theoretical approach to constitutional
interpretation is termed "balancing." See id. (defining the characteristics of a "balancing
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state rule's arbitrariness and "absurdity," especially since an accom-
plice was permitted to testify for the defense once acquitted at
his/her own trial, and the prosecution was always permitted to
admit the accomplice's testimony against the defendant.76 Presum-
ably, the state's interest in preventing perjured testimony from
reaching the jury was not rationally furthered by an a priori ban on
a whole category of evidence, particularly when the incentive to
fabricate may be even greater once the accomplice has been
cleared of all charges and cannot be retried for the same of-
fense."7
One commentator suggested that the primary lesson of Wash-
ington is that "the defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence
outweighs the court's interest in preventing perjured or otherwise
potentially unreliable testimony."' Nowhere in the opinion, how-
ever, was the legitimacy of the state's interest questioned; rather, it
was the unreasonable means utilized that proved violative of the
Compulsory Process Clause.79 Furthermore, the narrow holding of
opinion"). Although some critics of this approach attack the legitimacy of entrusting the
judiciary with placing values not clearly derivable from the Constitution on competing
interests, and functioning as pseudolegislatures, see id. at 984-86, the implicit role of the
judge as "balancer" is subsumed in the Compulsory Process Clause and the interests in-
volved are clear. See TRIBE, supra note 68, at 711. Most challenges based on the
defendant's right to present evidence stem from a trial court's exclusion of exculpatory
evidence under a general evidence rule, like Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See FED. R.
EVID. 702 (governing the admissibility of expert testimony); see also infra notes 138-41
and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858
(1982)). A review of a compulsory process claim requires review of judicial action. No
one would question the discretionary role of the judge to control the form and structure
of a trial, even though this supervisory power exerts some restrictions on the content of
the trial. See TRIBE, supra note 68, at 711 ("Values of accuracy, participation and predict-
ability are matters that judges are continually required to consider and balance."). And
considering a compulsory process claim in the context from which it arose-a tri-
al-seems to lend credence to the ability of a reviewing court to appreciate and assign
value to the interests at stake when implementing evidentiary controls. It is beyond the
scope of this Note, however, to debate the use of balancing to interpret constitutional
mandate; however, if the Court is in fact engaged in balancing when interpreting the
Compulsory and Due Process Clauses, as seems apparent from the language and tone of
Washington, Chambers, and Rock, then it is important to recognize that "under a regime
of balancing, a constitutional judgment no longer looks like a trump. It seems merely to
be a card of a higher value in the same suit." See Aleinikoff, supra, at 992.
76. See Washington, 388 U.S. at 22-23.
77 See Id. at 23.
78. ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
131 (1992).
79 See Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 (finding that the state's arbitrary rule preventing a
category of defense witnesses from testifying was unconstitutional); see also Montana v.
Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2017 n.1 (1996) ("So long as the category of excluded evi-
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Washington confirms that the defendant's right is not triggered
until the proffered testimony is proven both "relevant and material
to the defense." 80 Thus, the state's interest in preventing jurors
from drawing erroneous inferences based on irrelevant evidence,
which includes evidence deemed unreliable, was not only upheld
by the Court, but operated as a precondition to the existence of the
defendant's right.81
Similar concerns for, and deference to the state's interest in the
reliability of evidence permeated Chambers v. Mississippi.82 Spe-
cifically, the Court stated that "we need not decide in this case
whether, under other circumstances, [the rule excluding only hear-
say against pecuniary interest] might serve some valid state purpose
by excluding untrustworthy testimony." 3 Again, the Court ap-
peared willing to accept that "some" state justification for an evi-
dentiary rule may sufficiently outweigh the defendant's exercise of
his/her right to present witnesses at trial under certain circumstanc-
es. The "mechanistic" application of the hearsay rule proved fatal
to the State, but the Court expressly left it free to reasonably apply
and enforce its evidentiary rules.84
The evolving rationality standard was not without "bite," 5
dence is selected on a basis that has good and traditional policy support, it ought to be
valid.").
80- See Washington, 388 U.S. at 23. The Court noted further that "[i]t is undisputed
that [the accomplice's] testimony would have been relevant and material, and that it was
vital to the defense." Id. at 16; see Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867 (holding that the
defendant must show that witness testimony was both "material and favorable to his de-
fense" to establish a violation of the right to compulsory process).
S. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & Robert G. Scofield, The Recognition of an
Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce Expert Testimony, Attacking the Weight of
Prosecution Science Evidence: The Antidote for the Supreme Court's Mistaken Assumption
in California v. Trombetta, 33 ARiZ. L. REV. 59, 76 (1991) (noting that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to present defense evidence is only invocable when the defendant establishes
that the evidence is "highly material" and reliable).
'- 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
" Id. at 300 (emphasis added) (noting also the "considerable assurance of.. . reli-
ability" surrounding the hearsay declarant's confession).
' See id. at 302-03.
85 Gerald Gunther characterized the development of analogous "rationality" standards
in the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause as
better accommodated by a "means-focused" review of a broad range of social and eco-
nomic regulations. See Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1972). This
elevated rationality review would require the Court to "assess the means in terms of legis-
lative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture." GERALD
GuNTHER, CONSTrutTnONAL LAw 620 (12th ed. 1991) [hereinafter CONSTTTONAL LAW].
As was the case in both Chambers and Washington, the Court overturned evidentiary
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however, as was evident in Crane v. Kentucky. 6 The Crane anal-
ysis began with the declaration that "[w]hether rooted directly in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the
Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amend-
ment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.""' From this multitude
of Constitutional support, the Court held that the exclusion of
testimony concerning the circumstances of the defendant's confes-
sion deprived him of a fair opportunity to present a defense.88
The Court did not fail to acknowledge, however, the state's power
to apply exclusionary rules that themselves serve the "interests of
fairness and reliability." 9 More importantly, the Court seized up-
on the state's failure to provide "any rational justification for the
wholesale exclusion of this body of potentially exculpatory evi-
dence." Perhaps the key to this decision rested on the inequity
that resulted from permitting the prosecution to introduce the
defendant's confession at trial, and preventing the jury from con-
sidering evidence that directly tested the credibility of that confes-
sion. To the extent that the exclusion of this evidence did not
further the state's interest in ensuring reliability, and was contrary
to basic notions of fairness, the state's power to apply its eviden-
tiary rules could be curtailed.9
The only apparent divergence from the rationality review and
respect accorded the states in enforcing their evidentiary rules
emerged in Rock v. Arkansas.' The heightened scrutiny that the
Court appeared to *engage in is evidenced by its focus on "proce-
dural safeguards" as alternative means of protecting the integrity of
the fact finding process. 3 The "least restrictive means" analysis
rules that had no rational basis in fact.
476 U.S. 683 (1986).
. Id. at 690 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
See id. at 687.
8. Id. at 690. "We acknowledge also our traditional reluctance to impose constitutional
constraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial courts." Id. at 689.
9' Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
91. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2022 (1996) ("Crane does nothing to
undermine the principle that the introduction of relevant evidence can be limited by the
State for a 'valid' reason...
2 483 U.S. 44 (1986).
93 See id. at 61. Although the Court suggested several safeguards, it left it to the
states to establish "guidelines to aid ... in the evaluation of posthypnosis testimony."
See id. It also noted that cross-examination remained a viable means of testing the accura-
cy of testimony. See id.
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the Court engaged in usually signals strict scrutiny of both the
means and the ends of a particular state rule or regulation, and is
reserved for rights deemed "fundamental."94 Although the Court
did not hold that the state's interest in ensuring the reliability of
proffered evidence was insufficient, it did require a narrower means
of effectuating that purpose.95
The decision prompted one commentator to suggest that the
defendant could surmount a common law or statutory exclusion of
any exculpatory scientific evidence through an extension of the
constitutional principles announced, notwithstanding the potential
unreliability of the evidence.96 Assuming that the right to present
evidence can be triggered by a proffer of "shaky" scientific evi-
dence,7 the heightened standard of review applied in Rock is not
automatically applicable. The Court's decision was expressly limit-
ed to the admissibility of the defendant's own hypnotically re-
freshed testimony, despite the unreliability of the underlying tech-
nique.98 The Court recognized that Arkansas' per se rule exclud-
ing all posthypnosis testimony did not advance the truth-seeking
function of a criminal trial since it provided the Court no opportu-
nity to examine the reliability of testimony in a particular case.99
As discussed previously, Washington and its progeny estab-
lished the defendant's right to present witnesses at trial, but ap-
peared to require only a rational justification for the state's appli-
cation of an evidentiary rule governing admissibility." The
Court's apparent deviation from this standard in Rock can be attrib-
' See CONSTrlONAL LAW, supra note 85, at 603.
9S. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 61 ("Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is
an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the
State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections." (emphasis added)).
96- See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: The Constitutional Right to Sur-
mount Exclusionary Rules Barring the Introduction of Exculpatory Scientific Evidence, 32
CRiM. L. BuLL. 255, 255 (1996).
'- The legitimacy of this assumption will be tested further in Section II, in the con-
text of rules governing the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. See infra notes 126-
73 and accompanying text.
9 See Rock, 483 U.S. at 58 n.15. But see Peter Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74
Mitr. L. REv. 191, 203 (1975) (arguing that compulsory process extends to expert opin-
ion testimony based on well-accepted scientific techniques); Charles D. Gill, Jr., Casenote,
The Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony: Rock v. Arkansas, 30 B.C. L.
REv. 573, 593 (1989) (arguing that Rock will be extended to defense witnesses other than
the accused).
99- See Rock, 483 U.S. at 61 ("A state's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evi-
dence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in a particular case.").
" See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 48:865
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY
uted to its recognition of the defendant's right to testify as funda-
mental."' The structure of the Sixth Amendment is amenable to
the implication that the defendant has a right of self-representation;
more generally, the Sixth Amendment "grants to the accused per-
sonally the right to make his defense.""
Furthermore, if the predominant theory or purpose of compul-
sory process is to equalize the position of the defendant and the
prosecution at trial, 3 that purpose is not thwarted by a decision
to exclude evidence that is unreliable or only marginally trustwor-
thy. The purpose of compulsory process is neither to diminish the
capacity of the prosecution to serve society's interest in obtaining a
just and accurate verdict, nor to award the defendant a tactical ad-
vantage. Compulsory process serves neutral principles. °4 The
Sixth Amendment itself leaves the legislature, federal and state,
wide latitude to define the advantages each side is accorded at
trial. For example, an evidentiary rule barring a whole category of
exculpatory evidence can be characterized as a redefinition of the
elements of the offense, having the effect of rendering the
prosecution's burden easier to bear."°5 But the doctrines of
actus reus, mens rea, insanity... and duress have histori-
cally provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment
of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal
law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medi-
cal views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment
has always been thought to be the province of the
States. 6
101. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 53 n.10 ("On numerous occasions the Court has proceeded
on the premise that the right to testify on one's own behalf. in defense to a criminal
charge is a fundamental constitutional right.").
"7- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). In addition, the right to testify on
one's own behalf is "essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process." Id. at
819 n.15.
103 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
" But see, e.g., Clinton, supra note 17, at 756 (arguing that in weighing competing
interests surrounding admissibility, the balance is struck in the defendant's favor); Westen,
supra note 15, at 107 (arguing the same point).
105 In a recent case, the Supreme Court held that a state's statutory ban on using
evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the mens rea element of a crime did not
violate due process, since the use of voluntary intoxication as probative of mens rea "is
of too recent vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform and permanent allegiance
to qualify as fundamental." Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2021 (1996). The
Court further noted that although the statute "made it easier for the State to meet the
requirement of proving mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt," this did not impair its
constitutionality. Id. at 2023.
'0- Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
1998]
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Similarly, rules of evidence provide the framework within which
these doctrines operate, and have evolved to facilitate and imple-
ment this "process of adjustment." In this respect, an evidentiary
rule, legislatively created and judicially applied, is entitled to the
same degree of deference accorded to the substantive rules that
shape its scope and function. Thus, interpreting the Compulsory
Process Clause to err on the side of the defendant and compel the
admission of potentially unreliable evidence threatens to
constitutionalize a standard of reliability and relevancy that, tradi-
tionally, legislatures have defined. To appreciate the impact of such
an interpretation, it must be examined in the context of the key
components of the criminal trial process-the adversary system and
the jury system.
A. Adversarial Posture of a Criminal Trial
Accuracy, efficiency, and fairness are the hallmarks of compre-
hensive procedures that construct the framework within which
disputes are resolved.'O' As the cornerstone of adjudication in the
United States, the adversary system must operate within this frame-
work. 8 One of the primary purposes of the Sixth Amendment is
to ensure the defendant a fair opportunity to participate in his/her
trial,'09 and thereby preserve the adversarial mode of testing the
hypothesis of innocence. Given that the adversary system is firmly
established in the United States,"' and that the principle of parity
is embodied in the structure of the Sixth Amendment, application
of an evidentiary rule which destroys one to the detriment of the
other is deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny.
However, the exclusion of, for example, expert testimony based
solely on its potential unreliability, does not strike a fatal blow to
477 U.S. 79, 89 n.5 (1986) (holding that a state is free to change its criminal laws, even
if, as a consequence, it makes it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions).
107. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE 9
(1983).
". See id. at 10.
". See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20 (1967) ("Mhe Framers of the Constitu-
tion felt it necessary specifically to provide that defendants in criminal cases should be
provided the means of obtaining witnesses so that their own evidence, as well as the
prosecution's, might be evaluated by the jury."); cf Westen, supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the evolution of the principle of participation by compulsory pro-
cess of the defendant in trial).
" See WAYNE R. LAFAVRE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(b) (2d
ed. 1992).
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the heart of the adversary system."' On the contrary, rules serve
to preserve the integrity of the fact finding process by reducing the
distortion with which unreliable evidence may infect the trial pro-
cess."' What is fundamental then, is the opportunity to offer ex-
pert testimony for admission at trial and to have its admissibility
determined through an adversarial hearing .designed to evaluate its
reliability and relevancy; the Court has never contested this means
of evaluating the admissibility of defense evidence.
B. Interaction of the Jury System and Evidentiary Rules
An impartial fact finder is a fundamental component of the
adversary system, responsible for assessing credibility and assigning
weight to the competing evidentiary contentions presented at tri-
al."' The modem role of the jury as impartial decision maker
contrasts sharply with the early English jury, which had special
knowledge of the facts surrounding the case.!1 4 The interrelated
function of juror and witness during the thirteenth century obviated
the need for rules of evidence; 5 not until their roles became dis-
tinct were rules required to control the interaction of witnesses and
jurors. 16
The law of evidence developed as a "set of primary rules of
exclusion; and then [as] a set of exceptions to these rules.""' 7
Tests of admissibility center around relevancy and practical consid-
. The Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility noted the proper role of proof
in the adversary system: "Each advocate comes to the hearing prepared to present his
proofs and arguments, knowing at the same time that his arguments may fail to persuade
and that his proofs may be rejected as inadequate." Professional Responsibility: Report of
the-Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958).
92' See FED. R. EvID. 702 (attempting to prevent such distortion by outlining the
circumstances in which an expert may give opinion testimony).
"' See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968) ("In every State ... the
structure and style of the criminal process ... are of the sort that naturally complement
jury trial, and have developed in connection with and in reliance upon jury trial.").
-* The foundations of the modem criminal procedural practices of accusation through
grand jury indictment and trial by jury have as their forerunner the inquest; the inquest
was "an answer or declaration of truth ...by a body of men from the same neighbor-
hood who were summoned by some official, on the authority of the crown, to reply un-
der oath to any inquiries ... addressed to them." LEONARD W. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT 7 (1968). It was thought that men from the same locality "were most
likely to know best the answers to questions relating to" the particular crime charged or
claim asserted. Id. at 7-8.
itS. See 9 W.S. HoLDSwORTH, A ISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 178 (1924).
16- See iU at 182.
117. JAMES BRADLEY TIsAYER, A PRELIMvNARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COM-
MON LAw 265 (1898).
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erations, such as the likelihood of confusing or misleading the jury
through the introduction of evidence likely to be "overestimated by
that body.""' This practical aspect of the analysis is the "charac-
teristic thing in the law of evidence; stamping it as the child of the
jury system. '1 19
Historically, the defendant was never afforded the unfettered
right to present evidence to the jury."' More importantly, he/she
was prohibited from introducing evidence that had a tendency to
mislead or confuse. The decision to exclude logically relevant
evidence rested within the discretion of the trial judge, who was in
a better position to evaluate the jury's capacity to comprehend
complex evidence.' It was predominantly through judicial fiat,
not constitutional challenge, that exceptions to exclusionary rules
developed;" 2 these exceptions signified the evolving acceptance
of the jury as an independent and competent fact finding body.
Furthermore, the Court has always acknowledged the institu-
tional limitations which caution against engaging in a "finely tuned
review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules."" 3 This is espe-
cially true when the rules regulate the admissibility of novel scien-
tific evidence, the reliability of which is speculative and constantly
evolving. 24 As with other subject matter that generates diametric
opposition concerning the appropriate means of enforcement, the
Court will likely defer to the "laboratory of the states" where the
admissibility of expert testimony based on novel scientific evidence
is concerned."a
tl' Id. at 266; see also FED. R. EVID. 402; FED. R. EVID. 403.
"' THAYER, supra note 117, at 266.
'. See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892) ("Mhe theory of the
common law was to admit to the witness stand only those presumably honest, appreciat-
ing the sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by the result, and free from any of the
temptations of interest. The courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors.").
121. See Omelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996) ("A trial judge views
the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and events of the commu-
nity .... ); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (stating that "the state of
mind of a juror . . . lies 'peculiarly within a trial judge's province' (quoting Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985))).
'27 See THAYER, supra note 117, at 265.
23 Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983); see Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) ("[Wle should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to
intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States.").
124. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 65 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("One
would think that this deference would be at its highest in an area such as this, where, as
the Court concedes [in the majority opinion], that 'scientific understanding ... is still in
its infancy."' (quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 61 (second alteration in original))).
12. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct 2013, 2021 (1996) ("[Not every wide-
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Given that the right to present expert witness testimony will be
reviewed under a rationality standard, and that the structure of a
criminal trial seems to support such deferential review, an examina-
tion of the interests embodied in the rules of evidence governing
the admissibility of such testimony will illuminate the illusory
nature of the right when applied in this context.
m. THE CONVERGENCE OF ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS GOVERN-
ING EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE REQUIREMENTS
OF COMPULSORY PROCESS
A. Rules Governing Expert Opinion Testimony
The most common role the expert assumes at trial is as inter-
preter or evaluator of scientific evidence; as such, the expert is
called upon to give an opinion derived from the application of
scientific theories to the facts of the case.12 Generally, both the
common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude lay testi-
mony based on opinions and inferences; 7 testimony based on
personal knowledge or observation is viewed as "the best insurance
of trustworthy factual findings," since it seems "inherently reliable,
and we can be confident that the lay jurors can properly evaluate
the weight of the evidence."'" The increasing reliance on scien-
tific data, 29 and the corresponding need to present jurors with a
comprehensible interpretation of such evidence, led to the creation
of exceptions for expert testimony, such as that embodied in Feder-
al Rule of Evidence 702 ("FRE 702"9).130
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
Court distilled the admissibility standard contained in FRE 702.
spread experiment with a procedural rule favorable to criminal defendants establishes a
fundamental principle of justice.").
12 See CARLSON ET AL., supra note 107, at 387.
"27- See FED. R. EVID. 701.
2a CARLSON Er AL, supra note 107, at 379.
12" One commentator observed that scientific proof had become "the backbone of every
circumstantial evidence case." Ward F. Clark, Scientific Evidence, in THE PROSECUTOR'S
DESKBOOK 542, 543 (Patrick F. Healy & James P. Manak eds., 1971).
'30. FED. R. EviD. 702 provides that
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise.
"'- 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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The Court held that a trial judge "[flaced with a proffer of expert
scientific testimony" must determine whether the "expert is propos-
ing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. 132 Thus,
the measure of evidentiary reliability and relevance is the scientific
validity "of the principles that underlie a proposed submis-
sion."'3 The Rule requires the trial judge to "ensure that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant,
but reliable.' '
34
Recall that the defendant must demonstrate that the scientific
testimony offered is both reliable and material to trigger constitu-
tional protection. 35  Thus, a finding of unreliability by the trial
court is unlikely to raise a constitutional eyebrow. 36 In essence,
3' Id. at 592. Some of the factors that will assist in this determination are the test-
ability of the scientific theory or technique, whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review or publication, the potential error rate of the particular scientific
technique, the existence of standards regulating operation of the technique, and the general
acceptance of the theory or technique. See id. at 593-94. These factors are only a repre-
sentative subset of the "[mI]any factors (that] will bear on the inquiry." Id. at 593.
13. l. at 595. Although Daubert expressly held that the common law standard govern-
ing the admissibility of scientific evidence, known as the "general acceptance test," was
superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, many commentators view Daubert as vague
and "unlikely to revolutionize the law of scientific evidence." James R. McCall, Miscon-
ceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL.
L. REV. 363, 395; see also Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science. Frye, Daubert, and the
Federal Rules, 29 CRiM. L. Buu. 428, 435 (1993) (noting that state courts are still free
to use the "general acceptance test"); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term--Leading Cases,
107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 259 (1993) (noting that "the reliability inquiry under Daubert
appears no less vague and manipulable than the Frye [general acceptance] standard");
Hao-Nhien Q. Vu & Richard A. Tamor, Of Daubert, Elvis, and Precedential Relevance:
Live Sightings of a Dead Legal Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. REV. 487, 489 (1993) (arguing
that "the doctrine of precedential relevance survives" Daubert). In outlining the reliability
standard required by FRE 702, the Court appeared to distinguish between the validity of
the underlying theory, the validity of the technique applying the theory, and whether the
technique was applied correctly in the particular case. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
The courts are divided, however, over whether all three factors must be established before
the evidence is admitted. See 1 PAUL C. GLANNELU & EDWARD J. ImWNKELREED SCEN-
TItc EVIDENcE 33-38 (2d ed. 1993).
'3 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
135. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Although some courts phrased the stan-
dard in terms of relevancy, reliability and relevancy are not mutually exclusive concepts,
especially in the context of scientific testimony; unreliable evidence has no tendency to
assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue.
'36. Cf. Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (W.D. Va. 1976) (rejecting
the plaintiff's due process argument since "the very reason for excluding hypnotic evi-
dence is ...its potential unreliability"). Although Greenfield was decided before Rock, it
relies on the same the rationale as Rock---"an accused's constitutional right to testi-
fy-would not extend to such out-of-court statements." 1 GIANNEI.LI & IMWINKELRIED,
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the constitutional standard mirrors that governing admissibility, and
a procedure such as FRE 702, which tests the reliability of the evi-
dence prior to exclusion, seems constitutionally permissible. The
apparent redundancy of an independent constitutional inquiry is
heightened to the extent that the overarching purpose implicit in
FRE 702 coincides with that of the Sixth Amendment's Compulso-
ry Process Clause; both ensure that the verdict is a product of an
informed decision by the jury.3 7
A reliability standard, however, is not a finite or easily defin-
able concept. The Court acknowledged that the test under FRE 702
must be a flexible one, 3 but did not undertake to determine the
degree of reliability the rule requires. In contrast, the Court in
United States v. Valenzuela-Berna1139 indicated that a "height-
ened... materiality showing [is] required by the compulsory
process clause."'" In Valenzuela-Bernal, the Court held that the
Government's interest in deporting illegal aliens outweighed the
defendant's right to eye witness testimony that may have been
relevant to whether the defendant knew he was transporting illegal
aliens. 4' Thus, a defendant may face greater obstacles to invok-
ing protection under the Compulsory Process Clause than to over-
coming the admissibility hurdle of expert testimony rules such as
FRE 702.
Assuming the defendant is able to cast an evidentiary exclusion
as constitutionally suspect, the interests FRE 702 serve will usually
outweigh the right to present expert scientific testimony when
reviewed under a rationality standard. Courts have a legitimate
interest in safeguarding the integrity of the fact finding process to
ensure that a criminal trial preserves its truth-seeking function 42
supra note 133, at" 336.
'3 See Ibwinkeiried & Scofield, supra note 81, at 84 (noting that the primary ratio-
nale for the expert testimony rules is preventing the jury from "overestimating the proba-
tive value of expert testimony"); supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text (discussing
the evolution of the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause as jurors became inde-
pendent fact finders); cf Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the
Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 577 (1988) ("Consequently, if evidence rules
are thought to serve their own goals, they will also be thought to further confrontation's
goals [of preserving accuracy] and pass constitutional muster, and modem evidence rules
will naturally appear to further accuracy.").
'1 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
39- 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
"0- CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRMUNAL PROCEDURE 685
(2d ed. 1986).
141- See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 870-73.
'2- See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988) (considering this state interest
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It has an interest in preserving the integrity of the adversary sys-
tem, which depends on the admissibility of reliable evidence and
the rejection of unreliable evidence.143 It also has an interest in
the fair and efficient dispensation of justice.'" Exclusion of ex-
pert testimony that is based on scientific methodologies with ques-
tionable validity is a rational means of protecting these interests.
[The courts] fear that the lay jurors will assume that virtu-
ally all scientific testimony is infallible. If we work from
that premise, it makes sense to limit expert testimony to
opinions that merit the weight we think that jurors will
accord the opinions. If jurors are likely to give scientific
evidence certain or conclusive weight, it is arguable that
only scientific opinions of that degree of certitude should
be admitted. 45
This premise is particularly justified when the expert's testimo-
ny is based on probabilistic scientific evidence."4 Empirical re-
search on juror use of such evidence demonstrated that "if weak
evidence in support of a hypothesis follows strong evidence in
support of that hypothesis, people tend to move toward a more
neutral evaluation: they move toward the non-supported hypothe-
sis." 47 To the extent that unreliable evidence can be character-
valid).
14. See id.
"' See id.; see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 189 (1986) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) ("The States, of course, do have a compelling interest in the integrity of their
criminal trials." (emphasis added)).
145. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 107, at 400.
14& There is increasing reliance on scientific evidence based on statistical data and
probabilistic calculation; blood type, DNA, and hair sample evidence, for example, are
derived from such data. See Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence,
20 LAw & HUM. BEEHAv. 49, 49 (1996).
'47. IL at 74-75; see also Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information
Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heurisitics, 15 L. & SOC'Y REV. 123, 149 (1980)
(arguing that jurors ignore statistical evidence due to the difficulty in processing
probabilistic data); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statis-
tical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's
Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 181 (1987) (finding that lay people evaluate
variations in statistical information differently than experts). But see Joe S. Cecil et al.,
Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons From Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L.
REv. 727, 764 (1991) (finding that "the overall picture of the jury that emerges from the
available data indicates that juries are capable of deciding even very complex cases").
Even those who view jurors as competent to interpret complex scientific evidence, howev-
er, agree that the empirical data on juror comprehension is equivocal. See, e.g., Michael
S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence: A
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ized as "weak evidence," the tendency to average the information
presented rather than use it inferentially may result in distorted
factual conclusions.
Furthermore, expert scientific testimony is less amenable to the
more traditional means of assessing credibility-demeanor evidence
and cross-examination. The demeanor of a witness is an integral
factor in determining the reliability of testimony;' this is a dis-
tinguishing characteristic of cases like Washington v. Texas, 49
Chambers v. Mississippi,'50  and Rock v. Arkansas," where
there was an implicit presumption that the jury was capable of
assigning weight to the lay testimony. Expert testimony, however,
does not derive its credibility from the demeanor of the expert, but
from the validity of its underlying scientific principles. The danger
that jurors may confound the expert's credible demeanor with the
underlying scientific basis for the opinions expressed 52 provides
a rational basis for excluding testimony derived from potentially
unreliable scientific theories or techniques. While this danger may
also be present with lay testimony, the ability to objectively mea-
sure or quantify the reliability of the basis of expert testimony
provides a concrete reason to exclude the evidence.' In contrast,
lay testimony is generally not susceptible to such objective mea-
surements; cross-examination must expose untrustworthy testimo-
ny. 5 4
Cross-examination, however, is ineffective in counteracting the
dangers posed by expert testimony. In fact, it may exacerbate juror
confusion over complex scientific testimony, for it requires the jury
to expediently and unanimously resolve vast amounts of conflicting
scientific data over which experts, after perhaps years of study,
Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity", 25 CoNN. L. REV.
1083, 1094-97 (1993).
148. See Smith et al., supra note 146, at 75 (finding that the "neighbor's confidence in
her identification boosted her credibility and increased convictions").
'4" 388 U.S. 14, 23 ("Mhe State arbitrarily denied [the defendant] the right to put on
the stand a witness who was ... capable of testifying to events that he had personally
observed... " (emphasis added)).
ISO 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
1S1. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
152 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
13 An expert testifying on the basis of an application of a scientific technique, such
as polygraphy, can quantify the trustworthiness of the technique through predetermined
standard error rates. Standard error measures the degree of deviation from expected results
in any given application of a technique.
" See infra Part IVA for a discussion of polygraphy and its utility in detecting
deception.
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cannot reasonably agree. 5 More importantly, the prosecution's
onerous burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt5 6
renders the success of rehabilitative cross-examination unlikely,
since unreliable scientific evidence can easily generate a deceptive-
ly reasonable doubt.'57 In rejecting the utility of cross-examina-
tion to ferret out unreliable scientific evidence, one commentator
stated that "when a deviation from (laboratory] protocol renders the
results useless for scientific purposes, then they should have no
value in law either. Certainly it would grant an arrogant power to
the jury to allow it to choose to give weight to an opinion drawn
from fatally flawed scientific testing."'58
The presumption of innocence enjoyed by a criminal defendant,
and the heightened burden of persuasion allocated the prosecution,
reflect an extrinsic social policy that the criminal justice system
should bear the risk of acquitting a guilty individual. In essence, an
error of under-inclusion is implicit in our criminal system.' This
does not subordinate, however, the intrinsic policy of furthering
accuracy and reliability, as reflected in the evidentiary rules gov-
erning the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. The rules of
evidence operate independently within this framework to reduce
errors, not in favor of the defendant or the prosecution, but in
favor of the ultimate truth-seeking function of a criminal trial.
5. See generally People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (N.Y. 1989) (noting that
approximately 5,000 pages of testimony were generated on the reliability of DNA evi-
dence); People v. Reilly, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496, 501 (Cal. 1987) (noting that testimony about
the reliability of electrophoresis consumed eight days of court time).
" See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard has attained "Constitutional stature").
". In an analogous context, Justice O'Connor noted the role of burden allocation in
the fact finding process: "There will always be instances when the factfinding process will
be unable to resolve conclusively whether ... [something] is true or false; it is in those
cases that the burden of proof is dispositive." Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). This is particularly true in the case of testimony based on
novel scientific theories which engender wide skepticism as to their reliability.
158 James E. Starts, Recent Developments in Federal and State Rules Pertaining to
Medical and Scientific Expert Testimony, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 813, 837 (1996); see also
State v. Cavaliere, 663 A.2d 96 (N.H. 1995). In Cavaliere, the court excluded expert
testimony on child sexual abuse, reasoning that there are no scientifically reliable indica-
tors of abuse. See id. at 100. The court stated further that since the diagnosis would be
based on an expert's interpretation of a variety of factors that are difficult to critique, the
opinion would likely emerge unscathed even after cross-examination. See id.
". See R.S. Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type Two
Errors and the Law, 21 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 843, 844 n.3 (1988) (citing FRED ScHAUER,
FREE SPEEcH: A PHiLosoPHIcAL ENQUIRY 137 (1982)).
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B. Exclusion of Expert Testimony Under the Legal Relevance
Doctrine
The balancing of competing interests inherent in compulsory
process analysis is the predominant characteristic of the common
law legal relevance doctrine, or the modem codification of the
doctrine in a Federal Rules jurisdiction."6 Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403 ("FRE 403") provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
1 61
The Rules define "unfair prejudice" as an "undue tendency to sug-
gest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not neces-
sarily, an emotional one." 62 Thus, the doctrine reflects policies
of fairness, efficiency, and impartial decision making, all of which
are integral to the administration of a trial. 63 It is an additional
weapon in the trial judge's arsenal, through which he/she controls
the presentation of evidence to the jury.'
Under a legal relevance analysis, the starting point is identifica-
tion of the probative weight of the evidence."a Analogously, a
compulsory process challenge is analyzed on the basis of the
strength or weight of the defendant's right-fundamental or
nonfundamental.' The Rule next directs the judge to identify the
prejudicial dangers and balance these against the probative value of
the evidence. 67 Similarly, compulsory process analysis entails the
balancing of the defendant's right to admit the evidence against
valid state or governmental interests protected by the exclusionary
rule and its application to a particular item of evidence.'" It is at
this point that the analyses converge, since the valid state or gov-
16,. See CARLSON Er AL., supra note 107, at 242.
,62. FED. R. EVlD. 403.
1 id.
' See CARLSON Er AL, supra note 107, at 237.
'6" See id. (stating that legal relevance is a "shorthand expression for the judge's
power to exclude logically relevant evidence that offends [the] policies intrinsic to trial
administration").
'65 See id. at 238.
'6" See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
167 See CARLSON Er AL, supra note 107, at 238.
16. See supra notes 41, 59 and accompanying text.
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emmental interests are largely defined by the applicable rule, 169
and the weight assigned them by the trial judge will likely be
given deference by a reviewing court 7° Deference is particularly
justified when reviewing an exclusion of scientific testimony, since
an appellate court is in no better position to assess conflicting evi-
dence of reliability that may be extremely difficult to quantify.'
The Court implicitly acknowledged this premise in concluding that
"it is acceptable to deal with the potential for [undue prejudice]
through nonconstitutional sources like the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence," as opposed to constitutional sources. 72
A defendant, therefore, is unlikely to succeed in surmounting a
FRE 403 exclusion of scientific testimony. The dangers the rule
guards against have been identified as significant state or govern-
mental interests that may be rationally protected through the
exclusionary mechanisms within the discretionary power of the trial
judge. 173
IV. APPLICATION OF EXCLUSIONARY RULES TO CONSTrTUTIONAL
SCMNTIFIC TECHNIQUES
A. Admissibility of Polygraph Results
One ideal context in which the right to admit exculpatory sci-
entific evidence may be asserted is where the proffered testimony
is based on demonstrably reliable and well-accepted techniques,
such as fingerprint or blood-stain analysis.'74 Challenging a statu-
''9 FRE 403 expressly identifies the probative dangers the government seeks to curtail:
undue delay, prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. See FED. R.
EVID. 403.
'70. See United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990) (giving the trial
judge wide latitude in FRE 403 determinations); Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1058
(1st Cir. 1990) (giving the same deference); United States v. Barron, 707 F.2d 125, 128
(5th Cir. 1983) (giving the same deference); cf. Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
366 (1991) (holding that a deferential standard of review applies "with equal force to our
review of a state trial court's findings of fact made in connection with a federal constitu-
tional claim").
171 Cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) ("Where there are
two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous.").
,72 Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990); see United States v. Lech,
895 F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the defendant had "no constitutional
right to introduce [polygraph] evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed
by its tendency to confuse and mislead a jury").
173 See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
"7 See Imwinkelried, supra note 96, at 260 (noting that constitutional protection
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tory rule of per se inadmissibility of certain scientific evidence,
especially when the defendant's own testimony is restricted, the
precise issue in Rock v. Arkansas,75 is a second opportunity. The
strength of the right diminishes, however, when applied to novel
scientific techniques and theories of questionable reliability. 76
Even commentators who argue for the extension of Rock to wit-
nesses other than the defendant' recognize that defense counsel
"faces an uphill battle" in attempting to surmount an exclusionary
ruling. 78 And it is precisely in this context of shaky scientific
evidence that a defendant's right to admit such evidence win most
often arise and be most forcibly asserted.'79
For example, does the defendant, after Rock, have a constitu-
tional right to admit polygraph results to either demonstrate his/her
should be extended to scientific evidence that courts routinely admit on behalf of the
prosecution); Westen, supra note 98, at 203 ("lit is scarcely conceivable that defendants
could be constitutionally denied the opportunity to call experts to give opinion evidence
about such matters as fingerprints, bloodstains ... and other matters that routinely arise
in criminal litigation."). See generally 1 GLANNlELI & IMwINKELRIED, supra note 133,
chs. 16-17 (discussing the reliability of these techniques).
175- 483 U.S. 44 (1986).
176. Examples of such controversial scientific evidence include hypnotically refreshed
memory testimony, syndrome evidence (rape trauma and battered woman syndromes), and
psychological testimony about the unreliability of eyewitness identifications.
177. See, e.g., Tacey Clark Humphrey, Comment, Evidence-Rock v. Arkansas: Hypnot-
ically Refreshed Testimony of a Criminal Defendant Cannot Be Per Se Excluded from
Evidence, 18 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 297, 309 (1988) (arguing that testimony refreshed
by hypnosis is relevant and that since "[t]he defendant's due process rights entitle him to
present the relevant and material testimony of any witness," such testimony from witness-
es other than the defendant should be allowed); Mark Leen, Note, Hypnosis and the
Defendant's Right to Testify in a Criminal Case, 1989 UTAH L. REv. 545, 569 ("A tena-
ble argument can be made based on Rock that the prosecution's burden of proving the
unreliability of the hypnotically refreshed testimony should apply to the testimony of other
defense witnesses as well.").
t See Inwinkelried, supra note 96, at 265. Arguably, the in terrorem effect on a
trial court of knowing that a constitutional right may be lurking in the background as a
potent weapon on appeal may assist a defendant when offering novel scientific evidence
at trial. As discussed in Section H, however, if the exclusion was based on the unreli-
ability of the evidence, and the defendant had an opportunity to argue the grounds for
admissibility, the constitutional standard is not a stringent one. More fundamentally, the
validity of a defendant's constitutional right should not be derived from the purely tactical
advantage it may provide, especially when that advantage depends on a speculative assess-
ment of judicial psychology.
179- In most cases, it is the prosecution that will offer fingerprint or blood evidence
that links the defendant with the crime scene or the victim. The defendant usually resorts
to attacking the competency of the prosecution's expert and/or the accuracy of the particu-
lar tests performed on the evidence; contamination and lack of conformity to testing pro-
tocol are frequent arguments that the defense offers to either exclude the evidence as
unreliable or to impeach its credibility in the eyes of the jury.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
own credibility or to impeach a prosecution witness? The majority
view is that expert testimony based on polygraph results is inad-
missible, even when the parties stipulate to the contrary.' ° A
paucity of authority, however, has held that the defendant has a
due process or compulsory process right to admit polygraph evi-
dence when it is crucial to establishing a defense.' But the cas-
es themselves provide little precedential value, since they have
been either overruled or are inconsistent with later cases." Ad-
mittedly, most of the cases directly addressing the constitutional
issue were decided before Rock,'83 but that decision will likely be
narrowly construed. More importantly, it does not seem to alter the
evidentiary landscape by providing shelter from the trial court's
discretionary power to exclude, especially when viewed in conjunc-
tion with prior Supreme Court opinions. 4
Due to the continuing debate over the reliability of both the
1- See I GLANNELLI & IMWINKELaJD, supra note 133, at 244 n.160 (citing cases that
so hold).
's'. See McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
prosecution's refusal to stipulate to the admissibility of polygraph results without offering
a valid reason deprived the defendant of due process); Jackson v. Garrison, 495 F. Supp.
9, 11 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (finding that the exclusion of polygraph evidence denied the de-
fendant a fair trial), rev'd, 677 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1981); State v. Dorsey, 532 P.2d 912,
914-15 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (reversing the trial court's exclusion of polygraph evidence,
since the defendant had a due process right to present critical and reliable evidence), affd
on other grounds, 539 P.2d 204 (N.M. 1975); State v. Sims, 369 N.E.2d 24, 45-46 (Ohio
C.P. 1977) (finding that an implied right to present defense evidence in the Compulsory
Process Clause compelled the admission of polygraph evidence). For cases employing a
constitutional rationale when the defendant offers evidence for impeachment purposes,
compare United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 433-34 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the
results of a government witness' polygraph tests were admissible to prove bias), and Unit-
ed States v. Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494, 1501 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting the defendant's conten-
tion that the prosecution "opened the door" for the admission of polygraph evidence),
with United States v. A & S Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1991) (ex-
cluding polygraph evidence offered by the defendant against a government witness).
'"- See 1 GIANNELLI & IMwINKELRIED, supra note 133, at 243 (noting the weak
precedential value of Jackson, Sims, and Dorsey).
83. But see United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
that the admission of polygraph evidence favorable to the defense is not constitutionally
compelled); Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 715 (Ark. 1996) (holding that Rock is
only applicable to the defendant's testimony). One intermediate appellate court in the
military justice system, however, acknowledged the constitutional implications of Rock
when it held that Military Rule of Evidence 707, which barred the admission of all poly-
graph evidence, see MIL. R. EviD. 707, was unconstitutional when applied to defense evi-
dence. See United States v. Williams, 39 MJ. 555, 558 (A.C.M.R. 1994), vacated, 43
MJ. 348, 355 (C.A.A.F. 1994) (finding that the defendant waived the constitutional issue
when he failed to testify).
1" See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
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theory and technique of polygraphy, a defendant seeking admission
of polygraph evidence is unlikely to gain much advantage in hav-
ing the Compulsory Process Clause on his/her side.18 The theory
behind the most common form of polygraph examination, known
as the control question ("CQ") technique, is premised on two hy-
potheses: "(1) the psychological stress caused by the fear of detec-
tion produces involuntary physiological responses, and (2) a poly-
graph examiner, based on these responses as recorded by a poly-
graph machine, can detect deception."' 86 The inference of decep-
tion is based upon the examiner's comparison of the measured
physiologic responses to control questions (irrelevant to the subject
matter of the investigation) with those associated with answers to
highly relevant questions. 7 A greater physiologic response to
questions about the crime than to the other questions leads to the
inference of deception. '88 A predominant criticism of the CQ
technique is that changes in physiological reactions may be caused
by emotions other than the anxiety of giving a false response, such
as "when we are anxious about having to defend ourselves against
accusations, when we are questioned about sensitive topics-and,
for that matter, when we are elated or otherwise emotionally
stirred."'8 9 This theory, however, is only one of many advanced
to explain the probative value of polygraph tests.' 9° The lack of
consensus over the theoretical basis for the technique stems from
the complexity of the testing process, which is not "amenable to
easy understanding."''
"s- See generally 1 GIANNELU & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 133, at 216-17 (canvass-
ing some of the prominent criticisms of polygraph evidence); ANDRE A. MOENSSENS Er
AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CVIL AND CIUMiAL CASES 1196-1219 (4th ed. 1995) (dis-
cussing the polygraph technique and its legal status).
1s 1 GLANNEI.U & IMWDI ED, supra note 133, at 216.
'87. See David C. Raskiu, The Polygraph in 1986: Scientific, Professional and Legal
Issues Surrounding Application and Acceptance of Polygraph Evidence, 1986 UTAH L.
REV. 29, 34.
'm See I GLANNELU & IMwINKELRIED, supra note 133, at 216.
l" Benjamin Kleinmuntz & Julian i. Szucko, On the Fallibility of Lie Detection, 17
L. & SOC'Y REV. 85, 87 (1982); see David T. Lykken, The Lie Detector and the Law,
CRIm. DEF., May-June 1981, at 19, 21 ("[A]ny reaction that you might display when
answering deceptively you might also display another time, when you are being truthful").
290. See 1 GIANNME.I & IMWInucamEm, supra note 133, at 216 (citing other proposed
theories including the conditioned response theory, the conflict theory, and the threat-of-
punishment theory).
'9' See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
POLYGRAPH TESTING: A REvIEw AND EVALUATION-A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, OTA-
TM-H-15 (1983), reprinted in 12 POLYGRAPH 198, 201 (1983).
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In addition to the ambiguity surrounding the theory of
polygraphy, the technique attempting to apply such a theory is
equally controversial and is of suspect reliability:
Two preliminary points are not subject to dispute. First,
error rates frequently cited by field examiners are suspect
because they are often based on the assumption that poly-
graph results are correct unless proven otherwise. In many
instances no systematic follow-up studies have been con-
ducted to verify the examiner's conclusions, verification
criteria are not specified, and improper procedures are used
to compute the error rate.
Second, polygraph research is an ongoing process
[and] . . . "[o]nly now [in 1988] are superior paradigms
being developed which combine the ground truth of the
laboratory with the realism of field applications.""
Despite the claims of proponents of the technique, that current
research demonstrates the accuracy of polygraph tests conducted
under highly controlled circumstances, 93 compulsory process does
not mandate a more rigorous showing of unreliability than that
demanded under a FRE 702 analysis.'94 Although some argue
192 1 GIANNEILI & IMwINKELRUEI, supra note 133, at 225 (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Gorland H. Barland, The Polygraph Test in the USA and Elsewhere, in THE POLYGRAPH
TESr LIES, TRUTH AND SCIENCE 76 (Anthony Gale ed., 1988)). Other concerns over the
reliability of the technique include the use of countermeasures by subjects to defeat the
test and the lack of standardization of polygraph examiners. See McCall, supra note 133,
at 421-22.
". See 1 GLANNELLi & IMWINKEL.IED, supra note 133, at 229 (noting that the accura-
cy of field examiners ranged from 91-96% in identifying truthfulness and 85-95% in
identifying deception). Even with such results, proponents acknowledge that error rates "in
polygraph techniques will continue to be a significant consideration for courts considering
the admissibility of polygraph results." McCall, supra note 133, at 370. Still others recog-
nize that the "best defense one can offer for the continued use of the CQT [control ques-
tion technique] is that its accuracy is. indeterminate." William G. Iacono & Christopher J.
Patrick, Assessing Deception: Polygraph Techniques, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MAIN-
GERING AND DECEvrION 205, 233 (Richard Rogers ed., 1988).
1' See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of the
evidentiary reliability standard announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1992)). It is significant to note that two federal district courts,
in light of Daubert, have held that the results of a defendant's polygraph test were ad-
missible. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995) (giving a so-
phisticated analysis of validity studies, countermeasures, and the "friendly polygrapher"
theory); United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (D. Ariz. 1995) ("[P]olygraph
evidence may only be used to impeach or corroborate the credibility of the defendant.").
But see United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y 1993) (noting that
"nothing in Daubert would disturb the settled precedent that polygraph evidence is neither
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that the use of procedural safeguards to control testing protocol and
the ability of the prosecution to cross-examine or present rebuttal
evidence are sufficient means of ensuring reliability, a court's
exclusion of polygraph evidence would also be a reasonable means
of protecting the state or government's interest in screening out
unreliable evidence. Under a compulsory process analysis, the
governmental interest need not be compelling and the means of
safeguarding that interest need not be the least restrictive. In a
close case involving exculpatory novel or potentially unreliable
scientific evidence, which is precisely when a defendant's right to
compel admission is likely to be raised, the difficult issues raised
and resolved by a trial court in deciding to exclude expert testimo-
ny should not be subjected to potent constitutional scrutiny.
The most likely route to admissibility of polygraph evidence is
through statutory interpretation of evidentiary rules, as was done by
the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc."'95 In that case, the Court required a more sophisticated anal-
ysis of the theoretical and technical foundation of polygraphy.'"
In this regard, the Court recognized the distinctive role of the
judge:
We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the
judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will
prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and
innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck
by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive
search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized
resolution of legal disputes. 97
B. Psychiatric Evidence
Another type of scientific evidence that the defendant common-
ly offers, and courts frequently reject, is expert testimony concern-
ing the mental state of the defendant. This evidence is proffered to
show a lack of conformity to psychological profiles allegedly pre-
dictive of the criminal behavior at issue. The defendant may also
reliable nor admissible"). Neither Crumby nor Galbreth, however, based their decision on
constitutional principles or mentioned Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1986). Both deci-
sions were premised on an interpretation of Daubert that required a more sophisticated
reliability assessment.
'95. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
""- See id. at 597.
197. id.
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seek the admission of testimony regarding the psychological fitness
of a prosecution witness, such as expert evidence impugning the
reliability of eyewitness identifications.'"8
The untrustworthiness of psychiatric evidence is the usual
ground for its exclusion. One court, in excluding expert testimony
concerning the defendant's state of mind, found that "[t]here is no
evidence ... that a psychiatrist ... has any scientific knowledge
on which to base an opinion whether the petitioner evinced a de-
praved mind."' 99
If the psychiatric evidence is relied on for the dual inference
that the defendant lacks certain behavioral or psychological traits
that are correlated with and predictive of culpable conduct, and that
he/she acted in conformity with this character and did not commit
the crime charged, the underlying theory--criminal propensi-
ty-must be reliable. In State v. Cavallo,2re the New Jersey Su-
'98 See generally I GLANNELLI & IMWLNKELRIED, supra note 133, 263-68 (listing state
and federal cases that have ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the
reliability of eyewitness identification). The majority of courts have excluded this type of
evidence and appellate courts have sustained the exclusions. See id. There is some support
for the position that expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion, particularly cross-racial identifications, may assist jurors in weighing the credibility of
such evidence. See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist,
and the Jury, 13 LAW & HUM. BEAv. 311, 311 (1989) (reporting the results of an
experiment in which "jurors who heard expert testimony gave more weight to witnessing
and identification conditions and less weight to witness confidence"); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 986
(1984) (stating that "[u]nlike expert testimony on many other sources of identification
error, testimony concerning own-race effect . . . clearly meets evidentiary standards"). The
tentative nature of the psychological research in this area, however, and the danger that
jurors might substitute an assessment of the particular perception of the eyewitness(es) in
the trial with generalizations about human perceptive abilities should be sufficient to sus-
tain the constitutionality of exclusionary rulings. See United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d
921, 926 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that expert testimony concerning eyewitness identifica-
tions must meet the Daubert standard "by showing that the expert opinion is based upon
'scientific knowledge' which is both reliable and helpful"); Moore v. Tate, 882 F.2d 1107
(6th Cir. 1989) (sustaining the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the reliability of
eyewitness identifications and rejecting the defendant's constitutional arguments); State v.
Kemp, 507 A.2d 1387 (Conn. 1986) (holding the same).
'99. Haas v. Abrahamson, 705 F. Supp. 1370, 1375 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (emphasis added),
affd, 910 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1990). But see Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1255,
1258 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a state rule restricting psychiatric testimony to insanity
defenses interfered with the defendant's right to present evidence when such testimony
was offered to show that a second-degree murder conviction was justified); Hendershott v.
People, 653 P.2d 385, 397 (Colo. 1982) (finding constitutional error in a trial court's
statutory interpretation that permitted mental impairment evidence to negate specific intent
but not general mens rea).
2. 443 A.2d 1020 (NJ. 1982).
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preme Court not only upheld the exclusion of a psychiatrist's testi-
mony that the defendant did not have the "psychological traits of a
rapist," but also held that the exclusion did not violate his right to
compulsory process.31 The theory supporting the evidence was
based on two premises: "(1) there exist particular mental character-
istics peculiar to rapists, and (2) psychiatrists, by examining an
individual, can determine whether or not he possesses those charac-
teristics."' In finding no general acceptance of these proposi-
tions in either the medical or legal community, the court distin-
guished between the legitimate use of "repetitive, compulsive crimi-
nal sexual conduct" to identify those individuals amenable to reha-
bilitation, and the unsupported use of such data to infer criminal or
noncriminal conduct on a particular occasion.3 As with other
scientific theories or techniques, what has proven valid for one
purpose may not be equally so for another.3 4
The lack of scientific validity harpoons any claim that the
Sixth Amendment compels admission of such psychiatric evidence.
If the prosecution establishes a sufficient record to demonstrate the
unreliability of the proffered evidence, a trial court may exclude
the evidence as a reasonable means of ensuring the integrity of the
fact-finding process of a trial. The Sixth Amendment does not
establish a standard of reliability that exempts a defendant from the
admissibility requirements of an evidentiary rule. No matter how
potent a record the defense creates supporting the admission of
psychiatric evidence, a trial court's exclusion will be constitu-
20.' Id. at 1021-22. Although this case was decided before Daubert, and involved a
state evidentiary rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence, the focus of the
admissibility inquiry rested upon reliability. Scientific evidence is admissible in New Jer-
sey if it "possesses a 'sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable
results and will contribute materially to the ascertainment of truth.'" Id. at 1026 (quoting
State v. Cary, 230 A.2d 384, 387 (1967)). The court found that the policy of the rule
was to "exclude expert evidence when the danger it poses of prejudice, confusion and
diversion of attention exceeds its helpfulness to the factfinder because the expertise is not
sufficiently reliable." Id. It adopted a "general acceptance" standard to measure reliability,
but acknowledged that this was not the "only permissible means of demonstrating reliabili-
ty." Id.
20I at 1025.
2" Id. at 1026.
204, See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Twenty-First Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture:
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 137 Mi. L. REV. 167, 182 (1992) (noting,
for example, that hypnosis has proven therapeutically useful by refreshing memory, but is
not necessarily competent to produce accurate recollection at trial).
2 But see Imwinkelried, supra note 96, at 270 (arguing that an offer of proof estab-
lishing, among other things, the qualifications of the psychiatrist, hislher impartiality,
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tional if it is based on a rational reliability assessment. 6 In al-
most all instances of novel or controversial applications of forensic
psychiatry, the prosecution will advance a rational basis for exclu-
sion. As the court in State v. Cavallo concluded: "The rule of
Washington and its progeny was not designed to remove from the
trial courts, or from the drafters of state evidence rules, their tradi-
tional authority to assure the reliability and helpfulness of admitted
evidence."
VI. CONCLUSION
Compulsory Process is not a reprieve from judicial discretion
and legislative dictate as to the degree of reliability expected of
scientific evidence. It does not tip the scales in favor of admissibil-
ity when the defendant offers potentially unreliable scientific evi-
dence, but merely ensures him/her the opportunity to have the
evidence assessed. The primary goal of compulsory process is to
equalize the position of the defense and prosecution at trial. This
goal is served when a trial court or legislature reasonably assesses
the reliability of a particular scientific theory or technique; this
reliability assessment is the process that is constitutionally com-
pelled. As long as exclusion of the evidence is a rational means of
protecting the state or governmental interests in the accuracy of a
criminal trial and the integrity of the adversary process, the Consti-
tution will not compel admission. And in most cases where the
defendant seeks to admit potentially unreliable scientific evidence,
exclusion will be a rational means of safeguarding the relevant
interests. Unreliable evidence may corrupt and confuse the fact
finding process and has no tendency to assist the trier of fact.
Perhaps de novo review of trial court exclusions of scientific
evidence would better serve the policy that the trier of fact receive
all evidence that is relevant and helpful in determining guilt. The
role carved out for the trial court under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, however, is as gatekeeper, and scientific evidence must meet
some measure of reliability before reaching the jury. As long as
his/her independent verification of pertinent facts, and reliance on generally accepted diag-
nostic criteria will supply the defendant with a "'potent argument for surmounting restric-
tions to the admission of exculpatory psychiatric testimony").
206 A paradigm for such an analysis is the framework for examining evidentiary reli-
ability that the Supreme Court announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1992). See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
20- Cavallo, 443 A.2d at 1030.
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courts and legislatures remain flexible in their analysis and do not
slumber while technological advance transforms the unreliable into
the reliable, there is little danger that the Sixth Amendment will
reach for the key to the gate.
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